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Book Review by George A. Mocsary

Book Review by Alonzo L. Hamby

Monopoly of Violence

Present at the Creation

To Shake Their Guns in the Tyrant’s Face: Libertarian Political Violence and the Origins of the Militia Movement,
by Robert H. Churchill. University of Michigan Press, 384 pages, $35

Four Hats in the Ring: The 1912 Election and the Birth of Modern American Politics,
by Lewis L. Gould. University Press of Kansas, 235 pages, $29.95

R

obert churchill’s to shake their guns
in the Tyrant’s Face comes at the perfect
time. Two years after declaring (at long
last) that the Second Amendment secured an
individual’s right to keep a gun, this summer the
Supreme Court in McDonald v. City of Chicago
applied this principle to the states: they may
regulate guns, but not ban them.
To date, the best research on the Second
Amendment has been done by legal scholars.
Historians have largely been funded by organizations that favor gun control, with predictable
results. It is to his credit, then, that Churchill, a
professor of history at the University of Hartford, has written this unusual, thoughtful study
of the role of militias and their relation to the
Second Amendment.
He argues that, in protecting individual gun
possession, resistance to political tyranny was
just as important to the framers as self-defense.
“Though the debates of 1787–92 do include language evocative of an individual right,” Churchill
writes, “the overall discussion revolved around
the institutional organization of political violence,” i.e., militias. Whether the right was individual or collective in emphasis, however, “the
purpose behind the amendment was the same:
to vest in the Constitution the right of the people to retain the capacity to wage the natural
right of resistance to tyranny.” In other words,
violent resistance can itself be a constitutional
safeguard, a means to check government, not
merely overthrow it.
Churchill’s position will not satisfy either side
of the gun debate. Conservatives who view gun
possession as an individual right, unconnected
to militia service, will bridle at his emphasis on
institutional resistance. Most liberals will be
appalled, in turn, because they insist on tying
gun rights to service in official, state-run militias, and because these have fallen in desuetude,
so must the right that militias served to justify.
In Churchill’s view, this argument misses the
mark, and he does much to counter it.
To Shake Their Guns in the Tyrant’s Face is a
work in three acts, each a snapshot of a period in
our “collective memory” of the American Revolution. First, there is the “precedent of 1774,”
Churchill’s term for the founders’ belief in private arms as an “insurrectionary check on government.” He uses Fries’s Rebellion of 1799 as a
case study to explore early views on the bound-

aries of legitimate resistance, and the militia as
a “bulwark against despotism.” That uprising,
led by Pennsylvania Dutch farmers, sought to
resist a tax levied to fund the French-American Quasi-War. Angered by assessors strolling
through their towns and counting heads, the rebels chased them out; the uprising’s leaders were
arrested eventually (and pardoned, by President
John Adams). As the revolutionary era drew to
a close, Thomas Jefferson, taking office in 1801,
repudiated the use of force as a check on government—even though his own selection as president by the House of Representatives, following
the electoral college deadlock in 1800, had been
preceded by assurances from the governors of

Violent resistance can
itself be a constitutional
safeguard, a means to
check government, not
merely overthrow it.
Pennsylvania (Thomas McKean) and Virginia
(James Monroe) that their state militias stood
ready to resist any attempt by the House to impose a Federalist president upon the country.
The Civil War inaugurated the “era of American countersubversion,” during which the taking up of private arms, in the Northern mind
at least, became the essence of illegitimacy. In
1863–64, what some perceived as Lincoln’s
heavy-handedness led to calls for resistance that
coalesced into the Order of the Sons of Liberty,
named after the original Sons of Liberty that
claimed Samuel Adams, Paul Revere, and Patrick Henry as members. The new Sons were, in
fact, a band of Copperheads who organized an
armed anti-Union conspiracy. The conspirators
were tried in military tribunals, but rebel leaders
again found reprieve—this time in the Supreme
Court, which, in Ex parte Milligan (1866), held
that citizens must be tried in civilian courts, so
long as the latter continued to function (as they
had). The conspirators claimed that the verdict
validated their resistance to Lincoln’s government. Nevertheless, observes Churchill, after
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Remaking the Presidency: Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson, 1901–1916,
by Peri E. Arnold. University Press of Kansas, 277 pages, $34.95

the war, not only would most citizens accept the
state’s monopoly on violence, they saw it as their
patriotic duty to do so.
The fascinating, unpredictable rise in the
mid-1990s of a vociferous militia movement
broke with this 150-year-old consensus. What
Churchill calls federal “paramilitary policing”
(mainly by the FBI and ATF), coupled with
an “emerging war on guns,” once again revived
the “precedent of 1774.” Militias sprang up in a
number of states after fearsome clashes at Ruby
Ridge, Idaho, and Waco, Texas, which the militiamen saw as instances of government overreach met by constitutional civilian force.

The Dilemma of Progressivism: How Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson Reshaped the American Regime of Self-Government,
by Will Morrisey. Rowman & Littlefield, 268 pages, $70
Theodore Roosevelt, the Progressive Party, and the Transformation of American Democracy,
by Sidney M. Milkis. University Press of Kansas, 361 pages, $34.95

N

o other book parses the contemporary militia movement so carefully.
Churchill describes the movement’s
evolution into competing “constitutionalist”
and “millenarian” wings—the former emphasizing civic duty and open membership, the
latter simmering with bigotry and apocalyptic
paranoia. (He describes, too, how critics of the
movement deliberately try to conflate the two.)
Yet what the two seem to share, in varying
degrees, is an unshakable distrust of government and a reading of history in which many
within the governing classes have been willing
routinely, since the Civil War, to suppress their
political opponents. The book cites Franklin
D. Roosevelt, for example, who unleashed the
FBI against his domestic opponents. Churchill
draws persuasive parallels between the brown
scare of World War II (when German-American loyalties were questioned), the McCarthyist red scare that followed (its leaders drew
lessons from the brown scare), and the second
brown scare of the 1990s, directed at private
militias. He notes, too, the questions raised
concerning President George W. Bush’s assertions of power after 9/11 to conduct warrantless surveillance and to detain American
citizens as “enemy combatants.” Above all, the
author shows that the instinct to meet government force with arms is—whatever else it may
be—a recurrent part of our history.
George A. Mocsary is co-author (with Nicholas J.
Johnson, David B. Kopel, and Michael P. O’Shea)
of the first legal textbook on the Second Amendment and firearms policy, forthcoming from Aspen
Publishers in 2011.

T

he 20th century marked the rise
and consolidation of a new style of “progressive” politics. It featured drives for
greater equality of rights and condition, accompanied by the rapid growth of an activist state
with an extensive bureaucratic and regulatory
apparatus. Many social, cultural, and institutional currents assisted this movement, which
was spearheaded by dynamic political leaders who mobilized mass followings, employed
electoral politics to achieve major changes, and
seemed altogether essential agents of history.
Four new books seek to explain the emergence
of Progressivism by focusing on the presidents
and presidential aspirants who either drove it or
were overwhelmed by it.
Some scholars might still place the beginnings of 20th-century Progressivism in the
election of 1896 and William Jennings Bryan’s
Populist-Democratic insurgency. But notwithstanding his charisma and devoted mass following, Bryan was both a three-time loser in his
pursuit of the presidency and a retrograde figure

who never identified himself with the forces of
modernity that were transforming America. It
was Theodore Roosevelt who ushered the United States into the new political era. And after
four years of the inept William Howard Taft,
Woodrow Wilson emerged as the confirming
force who made Progressivism bipartisan.
The four-cornered election of 1912 signaled
the movement’s high tide, presenting voters a
choice among Taft’s tepid “standpatism,” Wilson’s Jeffersonian-tinged reformism, Roosevelt’s
New Nationalism, and Eugene V. Debs’s socialism. It has become conventional—and basically
correct—to portray the second-place finisher
T.R. as the ideological winner; Wilson largely
appropriated his New Nationalism over the
next eight years.
Ever since, progressivism (frequently called
“liberalism”) has been a nearly unstoppable
force in American politics, advanced in one form
or another by presidents as diverse as Herbert
Hoover, Franklin Roosevelt, Lyndon Johnson,
Richard Nixon, Bill Clinton, and George W.
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Bush, scarcely slowed by the rearguard actions
of Calvin Coolidge, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and
Ronald Reagan.

A

s a group, these four books attempt
to account for the origins of a “Progressive Era” that has endured with peaks
and valleys for more than a century—beginning
in a “trust-busting” fight against large-scale corporate capitalism; promoting the establishment
of an ever-growing regulatory, or administrative,
state; and increasingly advocating a social-democratic welfare regime that strives for equality
of results rather than equality of opportunity.
Louis Gould’s Four Hats in the Ring, a volume
in the “American Presidential Elections” series
published by the University Press of Kansas,
provides a brief, authoritative survey of the 1912
contest and its four extraordinary protagonists.
“For a moment,” he tells us, “political philosophy and principles really did matter.” The other
books under review generally confirm that assessment. Professor of history at the University

